IV   Social relation: the mechanism (Soziale Beziehung: Der Mechanismus)

1. The inner (internal, inside, inward) mechanism (Der innere Mechanismus)

A. Outlook (View, Prospect) (Ausblick)

Under/As (the) "inner (internal, inside, inward) mechanism" of the social relation, we understand the interrelating (interrelated) mental acts, whose execution (carrying out, performance) for the coming (bringing) about and the course (sequence or order of events) of a social relation is constitutive (Unter „innerem Mechanismus" der sozialen Beziehung verstehen wir die zusammenhängenden mentalen Akte, deren Vollzug für das Zustandekommen und den Ablauf einer sozialen Beziehung konstitutiv ist). These acts can be isolated in terms of theory, and observed as isolated, in the sense that they take place in the "interior (or inner world (dimension, space))" (on the "inside"; im „Inneren"), that is in the "spirit(-intellect)" or in the "psyche (mind, soul)" of every individual subject (also im „Geist" oder in der „Psyche" jedes einzelnen Subjekts), which – either way (anyway) – has a (takes) part (participates) in (partakes of) a social relation; that which we want to call the "outer (external, outside, outward) mechanism" of the social relation (den „äußeren Mechanismus" der sozialen Beziehung), cannot, on the other hand/however, be described if, concurrently, the "inner (internal)" and "outer (external)" acts (die „inneren" und „äußeren" Akte) are not taken into consideration in connection (association) [[with one another as acts]] (in respect) of all the – either way (one way or another, anyway) – participants in the social relation. The mental acts constantly interwoven with one another, which make up the inner (internal)

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relation of the social relation, are fundamentally (basically, in principle) two: namely, [[1]] the perception of the Other (other) as subjectivity, together with all the implications and imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of this property (quality, characteristic), and [[2]](,) the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other (Die miteinander stets verwobenen mentalen Akte, die den inneren Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung ausmachen, sind grundsätzlich zwei: Nämlich die Wahrnehmung des Anderen als Subjektivität samt allen Implikationen und Unwägbarkeiten dieser Eigenschaft, und das Sichhineinversetzen in die Lage des Anderen), i.e. both in his (the Other's) "inner (internal)" as well as in his (the Other's) "outer (external)" situation (or position). Since the analysis of both these mental acts, which, for their part, consist (are made up (comprised, composed)) of a number of (multiple) individual acts, occurs (takes place) (with)in the social-ontological framework and with social-ontological intent, thus, it (this analysis) does not mean/signify an(y) indirect rehabilitation of that psychologism, which we wanted to avoid in (regard to) the description of the spectrum of the social relation. The inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation by no means depends – in regard to its general form-related (i.e. formal) course, which social-ontologically alone is worth considering (comes into question)[i] –, on the personal psychological properties (qualities, characteristics) of the I (ego, Ego) or of the Other (Alter (alter [[= Latin]])); it (the said inner mechanism) is in all human subjects in (regard to) its basic (fundamental) features (characteristics, traits, attributes), the same and – what will prove to be decisive (crucial) – it (also) does not vary in accordance with whether one stays (lingers, resides) in/ with the friendly or inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation; (the) joyous (people) and (the) melancholic(s) (people), (the) extroverted (people) (extroverts) and (the) introverted (people) (introverts), (the) "good" (people) and (the) "bad (evil)" (people), friends and foes(,) have to (must) make use of it equally, irrespective of what refinement or coarsening (oversimplification) it

(the said inner mechanism of the social relation) experiences or undergoes in every individual (person). Also, the unavoidable use/usage of psychological concepts must not here lead [[us]] to psychologistic false steps (missteps, indiscretions, lapses). Because these concepts are used as generally (universally) applicable formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought (formal constructs)), or as always present variables, which in accordance with the personal case can be bound to entirely different content(s); these contents (this content), which might concern ((pre)occupy, busy) the psychologists of (the) individual(s) and, if need be, the historian or the sociologist, are not taken into account here. However, already the handling of the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation on the part of actors is not in the least all along (right down) the line psychologistically oriented. As we shall yet see (see later/below), the mental "system", which (the) actors erect (set (put) up, build, construct), in order to become (the) master (ruler, lord) of the original and never conclusively (definitively, finally) conquerable (defeatable, beatable) imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, spreads (stretches, extends) across (out over) several levels, in relation to which the subjectively meant meaning (sense) of alien/foreign act(ion)s (i.e. of the acts of others), just as (like) the objectively meant meaning (sense) of these same alien act(ion)s (i.e. acts of others), comes into consideration.

It must not especially (specifically) be explained that the "interior (or inner world (dimension, space))" (what is on the "inside") as a synonym of the "mental (dimension or element (system))" (des „Mentalen") merely constitutes a spatial metaphor, which is capable of a number of (several, multiple) interpretations, depending on how one wants to think of or imagine the psycho-physical nexus; fortunately (luckily), this thorny question can remain to be seen, i.e. left open, (with)in the social-ontological context. Likewise, it goes without

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saying that talk of the "inner (internal)" and "outer (external)" mechanism of the social relation is to (should, ought to) be comprehended as a simplifying (simplified) abstraction, which appears to be suitable, convenient and expedient for reasons (purposes) of (re)presentation and description. The formation, development, extension and completion of both mechanisms accompany each other genetically and structurally, although important conceptual distinctions (differentiations), like e.g. that between social action and the social relation, ultimately rest (are based) on the contrast between inner (internal) and outer (external) processes (orders or sequences of events)[1]. Finally, we shall point out (refer to, indicate) a further objective interrelation between two conceptual abstractions, which, admittedly (mind you), seems to be far less self-evident, however, whose social-ontological relevance cannot be estimated highly enough. It is a matter of the manner with which the belonging together (togetherness or common bond) (shared (overlapping) (part of each other's) identity) of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation is to be thought about. We (have) already said that the mechanism of the social relation behaves (is) indifferent(ly) towards (regarding) friendship and towards (regarding) enmity, that (it), therefore, (it) (the mechanism of the social relation) is capable of supporting every shape and form, and every crystallisation inside of the spectrum of the social relation, without functionally determined (conditioned) resistance. However, it is not a matter here merely of a mutual (reciprocal) indifference, which stands in the way of any possibility of the development (unfolding) of the social relation. Rather, a mutual (reciprocal) determination (or dependency) and a deep organic intertwining (entanglement) are present (exist), which must find expression in the logical unity (or coherence (cohesion)) of their social-ontological (re)presentation and description. Not only does the constantly remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) composition

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[1] See below Section 2Aa in this chapter.

or texture (die stets gleichbleibende Beschaffenheit) of the mechanism of the social relation constitute a necessary precondition (prerequisite, presupposition) for the enormous speed of movements in the spectrum of this same relation, which would turn out to be essentially more inflexible if every time (along) with the character of the relation, also that composition or texture, and consequently the constitution (die Verfassung) of man himself had to change (alter, vary). Still deeper perhaps do the breadth and flexibility of the spectrum of the social relation influence the mechanism itself. The latter (mechanism) is formed and developed in fact in the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital, essential) striving or endeavouring of the social actor to adapt and adjust himself – through constant and flexible movement – to the constant and flexible movement of the rest of the (on each and every respective occasion, relevant) actors on (along, as regards) the whole breadth of the spectrum of the social relation. As the development of all the possibilities of this spectrum presupposes the uniformity of the mechanism of the social relation, thus, for its part, the full activation of this mechanism presupposes that the social relation is dealt with not merely with regard to each and every respective actor standing across or opposite from an actor, but by bearing in mind all – apart from that (otherwise) – known possibilities of/for the development and unfolding of the social relation. The already existing background knowledge regarding the latter (social relation) constitutes the tacit starting point when it applies (is a matter/case) that one (an actor) will put oneself/himself in the position of (and or empathise with) the Other, and assess or appraise (estimate) which (what) place in the spectrum of the social relation the Other will occupy vis-à-vis the [[one's or the actor's own]] Ego – at any rate, the actions and reactions of the Other, without that background knowledge, can hardly be put into order and classified socially (Das schon vorhandene Hintergrundwissen über letztere bildet den stillschweigenden Ausgangspunkt, wenn es gilt, sich in die Lage des Anderen hineinzuversetzen und abzuschätzen, welchen Platz im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung der

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Andere dem Ego gegenüber einnehmen werde - jedenfalls lassen sich Aktionen und Reaktionen des Anderen ohne jene Hintergrundwissen kaum sozial einordnen). The other way around (Conversely): the relation of the Ego towards (vis-à-vis) the Other (alter) is not merely shaped and moulded on the basis of what the Ego knows or can know about the Alter thanks to the mechanism of the taking on (over) and assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption)) (dank des Mechanismus der Rollenübernahme), but into the relation, all (things) (i.e. everything), – what(ever) the Ego in general knows about the possibilities of the development of the spectrum of the social relation, about the exchangeability of places in that (spectrum of the social relation) and about the character of the social relation –, flow(s) as a formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding; Gestaltungsfaktor). The socially mediated (re)presentation or notion of the spectrum of the social relation (Die sozial vermittelte Vorstellung von Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung) determines, in this respect, the inner (internal) mechanism of the same (social relation), and it is not at all essential to be familiar from one's own experience with all the places inside of the spectrum in order to jointly take them (the said places inside the spectrum of the social relation) into account (or in order to factor them in), in (regard to) the relation towards (vis-à-vis) the Other. It is, in the course of this, irrelevant with how much detail and how concretely the ego imagines the spectrum – that can, naturally, vary enormously from man to man (person to person/human to human). However, everyone has at his disposal an, in practice, sufficient image (picture) of his polarity and continuity, and makes use (avails himself) of the mechanism of the social relation, by putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the position of the Other, with regard to exactly this image or picture.[ii]

For that reason (That is why), from a new point of view, the objective and methodological meaning of the fundamental thesis, which we formulated and explicated in (regard to) the critical discussion of methodological individualism,

becomes recognisable. The individual social relation takes place only before the background of the fact of society and of the social in its totality (Die einzelne soziale Beziehung findet erst vor dem Hintergrund des Faktums der Gesellschaft und des Sozialen in seiner Gesamtheit statt)[2]. If there were only two human beings (creatures, entities) in the world, then it would hardly (barely) cross their mind to call their relation towards (as between or with) each other a *social* relation. And in view of the unavoidable narrowness of the spectrum of their relation, which no social experience would extend or expand (widen, broaden), the mechanism of the social relation would be reduced to the animal(bestial)-reflexive (würde sich auch der Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung auf das Tierisch-Reflexive reduzieren). Only in the diachrony and the synchrony of society does the spectrum of the social relation unfold and develop fully, and this fully developed spectrum flows then via the processes of socialisation and (via) the individually stamped social experience as (a) formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding) into individual social relations and into the form-related (i.e. formal) remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) mechanism of the social relation (über die Sozialisierungsprozesse und die individuell geprägte soziale Erfahrung als Gestaltungsfaktor in die einzelnen sozialen Beziehungen und in den formal gleichbleibenden Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung ein). The fact of society is not of course, for its part, perceived as an undifferentiated whole, but as a plexus, network or mesh of relations, whose differentiation makes up exactly the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity (Das Faktum der Gesellschaft wird freilich seinerseits nicht als undifferenziertes Ganzes, sondern als Geflecht von Beziehungen wahrgenommen, deren Differenzierung eben das Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung in seiner Polarität und Kontinuität ausmacht). When the social subject forms an overall or a total judgement about/regarding

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[2] See Ch. II, Section 2Cc, cf. 3B, above.

society, and often uses (employs, utilises) it (the said overall or total judgement of society) as a guiding principle (guide) of/for it's (the social subject's) action (als Richtschnur seines Handelns), thus, it does not lose sight of, or touch with, the rich-in-variants spectrum of the social relation, its peripeteias/peripeteiae and imponderabilities or incalculabilities, but it identifies (equates) merely (simply) for some practical goal or purpose "society" with one of the forms of the relation (relational forms) existing in it ("society"). It (The said social subject) does that, again, as a rule, with (a) reservation(s) (proviso(s)) (conditionally), because it knows from social experience what could be in store ([[ironically:]] flourish and blossom) for those who do this without reservations (unconditionally), that is, (by) acting without the always new and always growing activity (actuation or operation) of the mechanism of the social relation whilst bearing (being borne) in mind (in respect of) all of the possibilities of development of the spectrum of the (this) same (social relation).

B.   The Other and his subjectivity

a.   The openness of the social relation and the imponderability of the Other

As legitimate as the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge, and the phenomenological question as regards the constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego), is too[3], yet these questions remain of slight social-ontological interest. Because social ontology begins, from its logic of founding, with (or in) the fact of society, that is, at an ontic and cognitive level at which

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[3] See Ch. II, Section 1, above. We must come back to that in this chapter, Section 1E, and indeed on the occasion of the frequently attempted connection of the question of constitution with normative perceptions about the essence of the social relation and of communication.

the elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego), regardless of how it (the said elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I) is executed (carried out or implemented) or is comprehended, must be presupposed as an already expired process (series of events). The plexus (mesh or network) of the social relation, which without society is absolutely inconceivable, comes about only through inner (internal) and outer (external) mechanisms, which indeed start from the process (series of events) of constitution, but leave it (the process of constitution) behind [[them (the inner and outer mechanisms of the social relation)]]. At the *social-ontological* level, the actor does not appear in connection with this latter process (of constitution), but only in connection with the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. This connection can be made (or restored) by outlining the general representation (or notion) which social actors – irrespective of the pre-history of the Other in their own consciousness – form in respect of one another, as follows: the Other exists and is made, first of all, perceptible in the shape or form of his body, which is distinguished from the rest of material things by means of the capability of independent movement (motion), that is, by the fact that he is the seat (or residence) and source of motives for independent movement, as well as for forces which enable this (independent movement). In the course of this, it appears to be decisive and crucial that this animate, i.e. thinking, willing and mobile (moving or movable) body does not belong to any group of animals whatsoever, but to the same species as the I (ego) observing it, which, consequently, understandably, tends to draw between itself or the members of its own species, and all other animal species (or kinds of animal), a much sharper dividing line than between these latter (animal species) ("man and animal (beast)" [[as opposed to the differences between non-human animals (= translator's addition)]]). The feeling of commonality (or common bond) between Ego and Alter is, of course, not primarily negative, i.e. it does not have to necessarily or primarily be obtained by means of the common demarcation or

delimitation against the rest of the animal species, but its positive character results from the immediate (direct) certainty that such a kind of animated body and such a kind of body looking that way, must also be similar, or like the Ego also, as to what is not perceptible outwardly (externally). The framework of relations for social relations is therefore created, by – beyond the outer (external) perception of the Other as a member of the same animal species as the Ego – the Ego developing mental acts, which relate or refer especially to the mental acts of the Other, and in the process presuming (supposing or assuming) an essence-like (i.e. essential) affinity (or relationship) or correspondence between one's own and alien (i.e. another's or others') mental acts.

In short, the social relation takes place on the basis of the ability of the Ego to recognise in the Other, a human subject like itself (i.e. the Ego), and (or) to ascribe to the Other, the predicate and the general properties (qualities or characteristics) of human subjectivity in the same sense as it does this (ascription or attribution) with regard to itself. But from what does the Ego recognise primarily and spontaneously its own and alien (another's) subjectivity, that is, subjectivity in general and as such? What form-related (i.e. formal) features of it (i.e. the Ego) first come into consideration before there can be talk of any content(s) whatsoever? Because precisely the generality and the ubiquity of certain form-related/formal features make it possible to subsume under the great common denominator of human subjectivity, beings which in every content-related comparison must prove to be more or less different. At the same time, the presence of these features is imposed or forced so directly upon the self-consciousness of the Ego that it (the Ego) itself and the Other cannot be comprehended as subjects other than as bearers of the same features. Still deeper than the dividing line between man and animal, runs that (dividing line) between man and the inanimate thing, and human subjectivity must descend and come down to this ontic depth, in order to define its own utmost self, and in a

second run-up or approach (i.e. attempt) to specify it (its own utmost self) in such a way that "human" and "animal or bestial" can be distinguished or told apart at an ontologically subordinate level. The human subject does not merely see in its own (cap)ability at movement (many inorganic things can move as well), its essential contrast or opposition to a thing (to things), but rather (it sees its own ability) in the fundamental capacity to make or omit this or that movement, that is, to behave or comport itself in the same situation in this way, or in another way. In actual fact, there is no situation (or position) and no necessity, to which the subject must bow and obey, if it absolutely does not want to, i.e. if it is ready to accept its own death. Plato basically enunciated this truth, and not merely a prejudice of slave society, when he opined that the freeman differed from the slave exactly by his readiness and preparedness to die, in order to not let himself be enslaved, whereas the slave preferred his naked (i.e. bare) life to freedom[4]. The subject can, therefore, choose *as* a subject not only between individual *acts and modes of behaviour*, but in fact between Being (Is) and Not Being (Non-Is), and precisely this latter in principle possibility seems to distinguish its subjectivity in a particularly drastic manner. The question "to be or not to be" concerns not merely the meaning and value of the life of a subjectivity brooding, ruminating melancholically, but the subjectivity in itself, and generally, as a specifically human ability to be.

In so far now as the I (ego) accords to the Other subjectivity in the same sense as it does to itself, that is, it attributes to itself and to the Other jointly and equally, the category "human subjects", it (the I) thinks of him (the Other) as having the (cap)ability, under all circumstances and in all situations, of doing something instead of something other, of behaving in this way instead of differently, irrespective out of which "rational" or "irrational" motives; and even if the Ego assumes the Other would on the basis of practical constraints, or

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[4] *Republic*, 387b, cf. 386b.

simply stable (or fixed) dispositions, follow with certainty this, and not that mode (manner or way) of acting, thus because of that, it (the Ego) does not deny him (the Other) a limine the natural talent, gift or aptitude to imagine, even under outer (external) or inner (internal) need and necessity in respect of acting (action), other options, choices and paths, and should the situation arise, even unexpectedly, to direct his deeds (doing, acts or action) towards these representations or notions. The mental acts of the I, which relate to the mental acts of the Other, and start from the conviction in respect of the equality of essence (essential equality or consubstantiality) of both (I and Other), consequently revolve, first of all, around the insight that the subject, the Other, is in general exactly like the subject, Ego, in the position to do or not do something, to behave in this way instead of otherwise and differently. This insight constitutes, accordingly, a first fundamental paraphrase of the (bilateral or mutual) knowledge (on both sides) regarding the subjective character of the Ego and the Alter, and rests or is based on the direct and immediate data of the self-consciousness of both. It is of decisive social-ontological meaning and significance that precisely the mental act, which makes the social relation possible, and initiates, namely, the ascertainment on both sides of the equal, in terms of essence, subjectivity of the Ego and the Alter, is originally connected to the knowledge that the Ego and the Alter would, exactly in their common peculiarity as subjects, equally be deprived of an accurate and precise calculation (reckoning or estimation) of their (i.e. each other's) future behaviour. Knowledge of the, in principle, possibility of a social relation amounts, therefore, to knowledge that this relation must, as a relation of subjects, contain an element or factor of changeability and imponderability (incalculability), regardless of how high the likelihood of that, on each and every respective occasion, is estimated to be. And what characterises the starting point of the social relation is only confirmed in the course of the same (social relation). Inside the series of the mental acts of the Ego, which relate or

refer to the mental acts of the Other, the special assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption)), namely the putting itself of the Ego in (and or empathising of the Ego with) the (inner (internal)) situation (or position) of the Other, now follows the general knowledge regarding the subjectivity of the Other. The subject, Alter, proves itself, in the course of this, on the basis of obvious (form-related, i.e. formal) comparisons with the subject, Ego, as the bearer of feelings, thoughts, intentions and action plans (plans of action), whose supposed or suspected great variety of form (multiformity) or ambiguity (equivocalness or multiple meanings), bears out or confirms the impression that the Ego stand across from someone, whose mental and outer (external) acts cannot be subjected to absolute control, and cannot be foreseen or anticipated with ultimate and conclusive certainty. Even at this higher level of the social relation, precisely that which constitutes the formal (i.e. form-related) presupposition of the process turns out to be the possible source of equivocations and doubts with regard to, in practice, decisive and crucial content(s).

   Both in the elementary (independent movement and choice between opposed options and choices) as well as in the higher sense (a social relation through the assumption of roles), subjectivity contains, therefore, an indissoluble core or nucleus of impenetrability, opacity and obscurity, and imponderability (incalculability), which is not accidental (random) and inessential (immaterial), but belongs to it (the said subjectivity) in terms of its (the said subjectivity's) essence; it (the indissoluble core of impenetrability etc.) characterises it (the said subjectivity) *as* subjectivity. This does not have anything to do with "irrationalism", it is not able to be put down (traced back or reduced) to "blind drives", rather the linear and uniform effect of such drives (urges, impulses), can make the behaviour of the subject precisely foreseeable (predictable) and ponderable (calculable); it only means that the subject *as* subject, for whichever

"irrational" or "rational" reasons, *can* at any time do something which runs counter to, and goes against, expectations and norms. The in principle and indomitable imponderability (incalculability) of the subject (of the Alter *and* of the Ego!) is seen, in other words, paradoxically, not so much in the fact that the Ego can never know with some certainty what the Alter will do, but in the fact that the Ego knows with absolute certainty that, on the basis of its character as subject, the Alter could just as well not do this same act or action, as unlikely as this may be under the given circumstances; finally, in fact, only subjects can be "insane" or "act insanely". In the framework of the social relation, imponderability (incalculability) is not necessarily connected with friendship or enmity (see below), rather it refers to the impossibility of bringing the behaviour of the Other under absolute control. Even at the moment in which the Other physically and outwardly (externally) completely submits, behaving in fact slavishly, the I can never fully determine (ascertain, detect or establish) with certainty whether behind the Other, contempt (disdain and or scorn) does not for instance stand – and exactly here we run or bump into the human and subjective element/dimension par excellence: because it cannot be imagined that another animal can feel contempt for a stronger animal, to which it must be subject(ed) and subjugated, and in this contempt, it can maintain a piece of subjective freedom, that is uncontrollability and imponderability (incalculability). Generally, therefore, the (possible) outer (external) or the (presumed or supposed) inner (internal) resistance of the Other is the element in which the Ego recognises the boundaries of its own wishes, intentions and plans of action, and exactly for this reason, it sees itself compelled and forced to develop its own subjectivity consciously; in this same resistance it (the Ego) recognises, however, simultaneously, that the Other has equally and equally originally at its disposal, subjectivity. In the nature of this resistance, incidentally, the difference between human subjects and things is made noticeable from another perspective. The resistance of the thing [[i.e. inanimate

object]] is static, it cannot, that is, in the course of confrontation of or by the subject, multiply, intensify and vary; it (the thing) is coped with, overcome and conquered as soon as the subject exerts (musters or summons (up)) the necessary effort, and the degree of this effort remains in principle the same for the same object. Things look differently regarding the resistance of the subject, whose (i.e. resistance's) multiplication (or intensification/potentiation) demands the multiplication of the effort of the other side up to a not-to-be-calculated-in-advance, or a once-and-for-all ascertainable, degree; here the boundary is death. Reflection upon the difference which exists between the imponderability (incalculability) of subjects and the imponderability (incalculability) of things, appears to be just as revealing or illuminating. Things become imponderable (incalculable) because they have properties (qualities) or aspects which the subject does not know; subjects, in regard to their behaviour, cannot always, and not with the same (or equal) certainty, be calculated, because knowledge regarding all possible motives and possible options (choices) cannot be tantamount to a prediction (forecast or prognostication) of subsequent acting (action); in regard to the thing, there is no grey zone between properties, situations and behaviour, however, in regard to the subject there is a grey zone, which is only inferable hypothetically. Psychological observation of babies and infants has, by the way, proved the central function of the plexus (mesh or network) of imponderability (incalculability) and resistance for the early formation and development of the representation and notion of subjectivity. As long as the baby can make use of the Other without problems for the instant(aneous) satisfaction of its own wishes, it hardly notices its (the Other's) character as a subject; only resistance, that is, the non-fulfilment of the baby's wishes, awakens in the baby, consciousness regarding actors, whose intentions

do not coincide or correspond with the baby's own intentions, and in these actors' independent movement, cannot be treated or handled like things.[5]

  With regard to the spectrum of the social relation, the uncontrollability or imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity means that any subject can at any time occupy any place in the said spectrum of the social relation; otherwise, anthropologically predestined classes of subjects would always be found or met in the same place in the spectrum, against which every historical and social experience speaks (i.e. is contrary)[6]. The great variety of form (multiformity) of the spectrum lives off and on the versatility of subjectivity, in relation to which every ethics, but also every systemic arrangement of society and every eschatology of history limps along, i.e. lags, behind. The same facts and circumstances can be apprehended by the subjectivity as follows: the spectrum of the social relation potentially emerges or looms on the horizon in the constitutive capacity of the subjectivity to develop motives and to make practical choices, which can lead the subjectivity to all possible places in the spectrum;[iii] every place in the spectrum of one's own potentiality finds, as it were, a counterpart in the spectrum of the social relation. That of course implies no kind of priority of a subjectivity, comprehended in terms of being a substance, vis-à-vis the spectrum of the social relation; it is a matter here, genetically and structurally, of the same thing, which is seen from two different perspectives [[i.e. that of the spectrum of the social relation, and that of an actual social relation itself]], and in the course of this, is conceptually reconstructed in a number of run-ups (i.e. approaches, attempts or onsets). Beside both these perspectives of the scientific observer, incidentally, the perspective of the Ego exists, in relation to which the Other likewise appears as the bearer of a spectrum of potentialities, which can find expression in various

[5] Wolf, "Understanding Others", esp. pp. 304, 301.
[6] See Ch. III, Section 2B, above.

forms of the social relation. The Ego, therefore, quasi automatically connects its perception or its analysis of the Other with the possibilities of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the social relation. The specific experience of the encounter with the Other exists, accordingly, in the opening up of a spectrum of possible relations with him (the Other), irrespective of which of them are regarded prima vista as more likely; that other sense or feeling, that, namely, already a false step at the beginning can give another turn to the matter or case, (counter)balances the sense of this (aforesaid prima facie) likelihood, after all. The, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) or opacity and impenetrability of the Other is combined, therefore, in the Ego's eyes, with the, in principle, openness of the social relation. On the temporal horizon of the social relation, this combination can only be solidified. Since the relation with the Other is seen from the crucial perspective of the future, the Ego cannot rely or count on, and be limited (restricted) by, the assessment of the Other's past behaviour, which corresponds with a certain possibility of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the relation. The Ego must let several possible modes of behaviour in various situations parade (pass in review) before it, so that finally the picture or image of the Other extends and expands into a spectrum of likely or probable actions and reactions; in the course of this, a more stable, steady or fixed image and picture in respect of character may or may not serve as a backdrop and aid in respect of orientation; in any case, a tension between the same (image and picture regarding character), and the endeavour as regards more concrete prognoses of behaviour, often dominates. The temporal perspective consequently makes the image or picture of the Other all the more ambiguous (with many meanings), and turns the Other into an open object of interpretation rather than into a completed and self-contained product of interpretation. The changes in behaviour unfold and develop in time, whereby in the imagination, every fold (i.e. aspect) in time, is attributed to a fold (i.e. aspect) in the spectrum of the social relation.

Admittedly, we should not forget that this analysis moves on social-ontological terrain, that is, it is abstracted from historically and sociologically apprehensible constructs, and that is why those institutions and conventions do not come into view (and are not examined) which very often keep within certain relative boundaries the, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of subjectivity. Though, one would err in relation to this matter, and furthermore, would misjudge and fail to appreciate the methodical, i.e. methodological, meaning of the interrelation between social ontology and history or sociology[7], if one wanted to bring to bear the seeming firmness, stability or fixedness of what is historically and sociologically ascertainable against the openness and fluidity of the social-ontological field, instead of apprehending the former (seemingly firm historical or sociological) from the point of view of the latter (open and fluid social-ontological). More fertile than every theoretical dispute, appears to us to be also in this case, the invocation of the innumerable testimonies and pieces of evidence from the collected wisdom in respect of life of all cultures and epochs, which prove beyond any doubt the representation or notion of the Ego in respect of the Other as a bundle of intentions to be worked out or deciphered, and still, in relation to that, as variable, that is, the conviction that the imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of human subjectivity constitutes a commonplace of social experience, and at the same time the foundation of very common practical maxims. The age of this conviction prohibits here any references to alleged "modern processes of differentiation", which jointly seize, cover and include society and the individual, and thus would have reinforced the complexity and the impenetrability, opacity and obscurity of both (society and the individual) as being in step (i.e. synchronised and in conformity with current society's environment overall). Ethnologists have noted how much the question of the, on

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[7] See Ch. II, Section 3A, above.

each and every respective occasion, presented mode of appearance vis-à-vis a fellow human, calls on or makes demands of the spirits in "natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)". In the course of this, it is not a matter only of the socially acceptable conduct or behaviour, but over and beyond that, of the choice of the right manner of acting (action) vis-à-vis another, which of its essence or nature cannot be absolutely transparent; multiple proverbs and sayings make exactly this embarrassment, predicament or this knowledge the, i.e. their theme or topic (subject matter)[8]. The Zande[iv] wonder rhetorically: "can one look into someone, like one looks through a widely-meshed basket?"[9], and the Jabo[v] formulate the same thought affirmatively: "one does not know what is going on in the head of the person next to him"[10]. The said theme or topic has in fact the semblance or appearance as if the certainty of the unrecognisability of the Other represents and constitutes a kind of a generally and universally acknowledged premise of social intercourse, in relation to which the deeper meaning of ritual and magic is supposed to exist exactly in bringing, with the usual means, the uncontrollable under control[11]. One could fill many pages with vivid and graphic testimonies from the older and newer literature, which go into this social-ontological central theme in all its possible variations, and prove the ubiquity of the experiences and insights in question[12]. However, here we must return to the language, and at the same time, to the methods of abstraction, whilst we disregard or refrain from the relieving conventions and the socially mediated pre-understandings of "daily normality", in order for us to imagine the presence of the Other in that elementary openness, which directly or indirectly, more or less consciously creeps (sneaks or slips) into every convention and into every mediated pre-

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[8] Thurnwald, *Bánaro*, p. 47; Lienhardt, "Self: public, private", esp. p. 146.

[9] Evans-Pritchard, *Essays*, p. 228 (in the English version: "Can one look into a person as one looks into an open-wove basket?")

[10] Herzog, *Jabo proverbs*, p. 157 (in the English version: "One does not know his fellow's mind"). Cf. Herskovits-Tagbwe, "Kru Proverbs", p. 247 (in the English version: "A man's not a bunch of palm-nuts, that you may sample him").

[11] Munn, "Gawan Kula", p. 284.

[12] "A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other", Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Book I, ch. 3 (beginning).

understanding too. This complete Other, who is still not a friend and not a foe, can exactly because of that, become or turn into both friend as well as foe; from him, help, just as much as danger, can emanate; in short, he represents in parvo the Janus face of sociality and of social reality in general[13]. Social experience and the view/perception of the Ego meets, therefore, anew with scientific knowledge, or the formation of hypotheses, in this case in regard to the thesis that subjectivity or personality must in principle be defined as potentiality in respect of acting and action, and the development of subjectivity as the development of the potentiality in respect of acting/action[14]. Formal (i.e. form-related) a priori knowledge regarding the immediate or particular circumstances and the individual aspects of the potentiality for acting and action, (that is, knowledge about the fact that the Other in general has motives, intentions, plans, means), does not, though, say anything certain about the concrete content of the to-be-expected acting or action as the each and every respective actualisation of the subject's specific the potentiality for acting and action. The Ego can anticipate the said expected actualisation for lack of special knowledge and indications by projecting onto the image or picture of the Other all that it knows from personal or social experience, directly or mediatedly (i.e. indirectly) about the intersubjective relations of socially living men/humans in general. This knowledge exists at this tier (level or stage) actually in regard to the banality that amongst men everything is possible; a banality, which indeed may be made fun of by some refined theoreticians, but which is of central meaning and significance in every, in practice, relevant social respect. Only as potentiality for acting and action in this breadth, is the Other capable of transferring or shifting the Ego into the state of affairs of attention (attentiveness) or even alertness, vigilance and watchfulness. And the immediate, direct general knowledge regarding the necessary ingredients in

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[13] Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Der Mensch*, esp. pp. 210, 220ff..
[14] Sears, "Theoretical Framework", esp. pp. 478, 480ff..

respect of the Other's potentiality for acting (action) (motives, representations, plans), sets in the Ego, the Ego's own potentiality for acting (action) in motion, the said knowledge constitutes [[does not (constitute)]][vi] in itself a reason for interaction. The Other's motives and intentions referring to the Ego and known to this Ego, must ipso facto call into being and bring to life the Ego's motives and intentions with reference and in relation to the Other.

The, in principle, impenetrability and imponderability (incalculability) of the Other is dealt with and managed, therefore, in respect of the Ego, first of all, through the summoning, enlisting and mobilising of personally acquired and socially mediated, general knowledge, which, of course, by no means is sufficient for the concrete handling and dealing with concrete Other. However, already this knowledge as the possibility of knowing the Other fairly generally, without having known him (the Other) in detail, attests to and shows that the Ego's social-ontologically fundamental positioning (attitude and stance) vis-à-vis the Other has two equally constitutive aspects. The inscrutable, unfathomable and imponderable (incalculable) Other is for the I (ego), the distant and the alien, yet as a being, which shares the property of subjectivity fully with the Ego, he (the Other) is for this (Ego) the nearest and the most familiar. As an Ego, one can just as well say to the Other, with Plautus, "Tam ego homo sum quam tu (= Latin = I am a man as much as you [[are (a man)]])"[15], or call out to him (the Other) with Shakespeare: "O, the difference of man and man!"[16]. The aspect of nearness (proximity) and of familiarity in the fundamental intersubjective relationship stems from the common certainty of the subjects that the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation must be the same on all sides by virtue of their mere being as a subject; and the aspect of distance, of difference, of imponderability (incalculability) stems just as much

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[15] *Asinaria*, II, 4, V. 490.
[16] *King Lear*, IV, 2, V. 26.

from the firm knowledge that that commonly possessed mechanism is connected with the most different content(s), and can serve the most different intentions. The analysis of the taking on and assumption of roles rests or is based on this dual foundation (i.e. the just mentioned aspect of proximity and aspect of distance), as the next sections of this chapter will show. The anthropologically–social-ontologically given (cap)ability at the taking on and the assumption of roles, and at the understanding of the stranger (foreigner, alien) or others remains in itself form-related (i.e. formal) and cannot lift (i.e. abolish, remove, set aside or do away with) the factor "imponderability (incalculability)" and "inscrutability (unfathomability)" by means of their mere existence (availability or presence), that is, the said (cap)ability cannot vouch for and guarantee that the concrete behaviour of the Other can in principle be foreseen or anticipated in this or that concrete situation. The general form-related (i.e. formal) (cap)ability at the taking on and assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger or others, differs, therefore, essentially from the (cap)ability at the taking on and assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger or others in a concrete situation. Likewise, general knowledge about man as subjectivity, which is basically the same in the Ego and in the Other, differs from knowledge about the individual man in his concrete individuality. La Rochefoucauld hit the nail on the head in so far as he opined that it is easier to know and recognise man in general than an individual (person)[17].

Imponderability (Incalculability) as a basic or fundamental feature of subjectivity, as it must be treated, handled or examined at this social-ontological tier (level or stage) of abstraction, does not self-evidently mean that absolutely nothing can be foreseen and pre-pondered/pre-calculated in the institutionally

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[17] «Il est plus aisé de connaître l'homme en général que de connaître un homme en particulier», *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 436.

structured life of society. Such a state of affairs would be just as irreconcilable or incompatible with the concept of social life itself as the proverbial war of all against all. But just as alien to reality would a concept of social life be, which does not want to admit that the imponderable (incalculable) penetrates (forces its way into), or is even always inherent in, the ponderable (calculable), in the same sense and to the same extent as the exception is interwoven with normality[18]. Max Weber did well in relation to that, to weave or work the word "chance (opportunity or prospects)" not only into the definition of "sociologically amorphous" power, but also into that definition of institutionally founded (authority as) dominance, which obviously is supposed to mean that not even punitive (i.e. disciplinary or penal) institutions are able to be certain of individual behaviour in every concrete case[19]. Generally, ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) in social life are subject to the same fluctuations and peripeteiae as the places of the actors in the spectrum of the social relation. Also, no fixed (stable and steady) interrelation between ponderability and friendship, or imponderability and enmity, can be established, made, manufactured or restored[20]. A considerable difference does indeed exist between friendship and enmity in that the former (friendship) must be wanted by both sides, whereas the latter (enmity) can (be created or produced and) come into being through the initiative of one side; yet this difference does not necessarily coincide with the difference between ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), (it is not certain in advance whether the otherwise unknown Other wants to be a friend or a foe, or whether the Ego wishes his/the Other's friendship); furthermore, the difference concerns the genetic priority of the social relation, not its course (sequence or order of

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[18] See Ch. III, Section 3B, above.

[19] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28.

[20] As de Jouvenel wants to establish, make or restore it, by calling or naming the foe «agent imprévisible» – «imprévisible parce qu'il n'est point partie à notre ligue d'amitié» (= "unpredictable agent" – "unpredictable because he is not at all a party to our league (alliance, bonds) of friendship"), see *Souveraineté*, p. 152.

events): friendships can, as is known, in their course, give bad or terrible surprises; on the other hand, some enmity proceeds, for instance as a result of the balance or equilibrium of forces, in or down relatively ordered and ponderable channels or courses and paths. One may not, therefore, confound and confuse ponderabilities (calculabilities) in general and as such with peace and security. Language use knows of "ponderable (calculable) friends" just like social life; however, enmity means the precise opposite of peace and security. Said differently: only within the framework of friendship is ponderability (calculability) synonymous with peace and security, and in this respect, one can define peace as the state of affairs which exists between friends[21]. This definition of peace has, though, the disadvantage that every enmity must be regarded as war, whereby the concept of peace can no longer by apprehended sharply (i.e. clearly) enough[22]. That is why it appears to be sensible and useful to stand the formula on its head (i.e. turn O. Brunner's phrase and wording upside down), that is, to start from peace instead of friendship, and to say along with the profound saying of the Joruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship[23]. This means: friendship is not founded in the lack or absence of subjective imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities), but in the lack or absence of objective dangers and risks. Furthermore, here, the bottom is knocked out of (i.e. the base is withdrawn from) psychological interpretations of the phenomenon by pointing out that friendship would not create good motives, but states of affairs in which bad or evil motives hardly could or would want to come to development (i.e. develop)[vii]. Ponderability (Calculability) of states of affairs (situations) and ponderability of subjectivity are, however, two different kinds of thing(s).

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[21] Thus, e.g. Brunner, *Land*, p. 24 [[this is a very touching acknowledgement and reference to the great "NAZI" historian, Otto Brunner, by P.K., whose statement/thesis P.K. immediately proceeds to qualify as to its scientific validity = translator's remark = absolutely nothing to do with P.K.]].

[22] See Ch. III, footnote 212, above.

[23] Ellis, *Yoruba-Speaking Peoples*, p. 219 (in the English wording or version: "peace is the father of friendship").

Likewise, two different things, however, are a ponderability (calculability) of states of affairs (situations), which concern or apply to concrete actors, ambiance(s) (i.e. atmospheres or environ(ment)s) and periods of time, and, a ponderability (calculability) which apprehends social life all in all (as a whole or in total), and is supposed to end up in the equation and identification of this same social life with "normality" per se and as such. Under, or as, normality, the dominance of fixed (steady, firm, stable) norms, that is, immunity against the effects of the exception, or against the state of affairs (situation) in which the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity can indeed further exist, but is socially irrelevant, is understood here; the said imponderability of subjectivity simply belongs to the "environment", not to the "system". The theoretical attempt at equating and identifying ponderability (calculability), normality and social life was, of course, not only undertaken by systems theory, but in actual fact, also by the phenomenologists of the lifeworld. Representatives of so-called "ethnomethodology", who wanted to harness and use Schütz for their own case, and correspondingly play him (Schütz) against Parsons, opined, however, that in the former (Schütz), typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) of perspectives as the basis of intersubjective communication remained constantly contingent, that is, dependent on the action of the actors; that Schütz does not attach any decisive effect to the common cultural background to these same actors[24]. That could be conceded and accepted in the sense that the typifications by Schütz avowedly apply to the wider with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) rather than to the narrower environment, with whose microscopic analysis the ethnomethodologists were concerned. During the transaction from the environment to the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), according to Schütz, a progressive or advanced anonymisation takes place, the

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[24] Thus, e.g. Heritage, *Garfinkel*, p. 56.

personal type is transformed here from a concrete alter ego into an ideal type, and the "wealth of variations" of intersubjective relations is reduced and decreases[25]. Schütz stresses in the course of this, that the ideal types of the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can often serve as "interpretive schemata (schemata in respective of interpretation) of the environment"; both the exchangeability and interchangeability of the perspectives – that is, the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the other (person) – as well as the agreement, on both sides, of the systems of relevance, rest or are based on idealisations, or the leaving aside and exclusion of the personal and the biographical[26]. – However, Schütz does not go down the reverse path, i.e. he does not proceed in the opposite direction. Schütz does not, namely, investigate under which circumstances and effects the typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) and idealisations thus coming into being can become problematic anew or even invalidated (untenable), he does not thematise (i.e. make as his subject matter for examination) their instrumental, i.e. precarious and changeable character, he disregards the constant movements in the spectrum of social relations, under whose pressure, typifications and idealisations must make a place (i.e. make room or make way) to concrete representations and notions. The distinction between environment and with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is by far not sufficient to make these complicated processes comprehensible, and is itself as extendable and expansible as one may like (or as it can be), and at all times, in need of interpretation. Schütz constructs, therefore, a "normality" beyond its ontological interweaving with the "exception", a "natural positioning or attitude" beyond the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity *as* subjectivity. This ontology of daily life grasps (apprehends and comprehends)

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[25] *Aufbau*, p. 256ff., 285; *Coll. Papers*, II, p. 37ff., 232ff..
[26] *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 11ff..

social action primarily as the production of commonly and jointly divided and split, i.e. shared, meaning, not as the pursuit of the meaningful goals (ends or purposes) on the part of concrete actors, in whose framework and according to whose logic, exactly meaning is divided, shared or split and redistributed[27 + viii]. In this important respect, Schütz comes closer to Parsons than he perhaps would have liked to. Schütz describes quasi automatised (i.e. automated) processes, which mean or signify action less, than a relief from, or relieving of, the tension and stress of existence *towards* meaningful and expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) action, and in regard to their (the said quasi automated processes), harmlessness is able to be shared between friends and foes, without the core of the social relation – the meeting of identities – having to be touched upon even only in the slightest[ix]. The model of the question and of the answer, which is supposed to (graphically-vividly) illustrate and demonstrate the communicative context of (mutual) understanding, (pre)supposes a highly unreal self-sufficiency and possibility of self-isolation of the actor. In social life, this actor has little opportunity to reflect (muse or ponder), in full peace and seclusion, on academic answers to academic questions of others, which are registered (recorded, noted or taken down) by others without commentary and without reaction. The actor is not left "in peace" or "alone", but is frequently placed under direct or indirect pressure to do things which he would not have done of his own accord. Not one possibility of isolation or of retreat (withdrawal), which would have saved and protected him from such a thing (i.e. the said pressure), but the potency given to him with his subjectivity to offer resistance, fight back and say no, bears witness and attests to his (cap)ability at acting (action) – still more than a consensus, which could also be interpreted as a lack of will. In the same manner, however, the subjectivity, as well as the (cap)ability at acting (action) of the Other, are proved. Every request or

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[27] Cf. Zaret, "From Weber", p. 1192.

entreaty, every exchange, every compulsion and coercion takes place thanks to the autonomy and independence of the Other, that is, of the possibility of his (the Other's) rejection or his resistance [[of and towards others]]. But Schütz, just as little as for instance Parsons or Mead, goes into this by no means ubiquitous, but definitely critical case[28].

One could now shove aside such thoughts in view of the benevolent effects of norms as stabilisers of expectations. Yet with that, only the just described model in its one-sidedness, and consequently unreality, is reproduced. Because the existence (availability and presence) of norms does not lift (i.e. revoke, abolish, annual, do away with) the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity and its action; "you should (or ought)" is no prognosis, but only an appeal[29]. Normative perceptions and views of society endeavour, nonetheless, to make out of appeals, prognoses, and for that reason, accordingly shut out, exclude or eliminate from contemplation what(ever) could blur a prognosis gained in such a manner. In an absolutely ponderable (calculable) world, though, the cognitive and normative expectations would coincide without any difficulty, but thus, as the world now just is, its essential difference to that (world of absolute ponderability) is already seen in the possibility of knowing that someone could violate or infringe norms. Over and above that, norms, which are supposed to regulate daily behaviour, frequently represent and constitute mere forms, whose content or tidings (i.e. message) which they communicate and transmit, depends on the subjectivity of those who make use of them (the said norms). One greets someone, e.g., by keeping to the outer/external form, but one does it in such a way that the corresponding gesture can betray or reveal indifference or even contempt, disdain and scorn. Every fairly experienced observer of social life knows that the art – during the keeping to the form – of remaining "hard and

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[28] I am following here Tyrell's excellent analysis, *Vergesellschaftung*, esp. pp. 374ff., 384ff., 396ff., 444ff..
[29] Loc. cit., p. 406ff..

unbending in regard to the matter at hand", belongs to the most refined [[(of) things]] in respect of what human – being together with one another (i.e. co-existence) – in the world has posited (or produced), and not only in the "differentiated modern". Likewise, generally known, are the cases in which the form serves the purposes and ends of deception and deceit, or is kept to and observed, on both sides, in the knowledge of its substantial irrelevance. In general, it is thus, that the norms of the lifeworld are only valid and apply at face value as long as nothing or little is at stake, as, that is, the actual and real concerns (issues and affairs) of identity are in no way touched upon, as no-one deprives, or withholds from, themselves and refuses or denies, their self-understanding, due recognition. This is the decisive criterion, not for instance, the boundaries between the environment and the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), which, incidentally, are always defined anew with regard to that criterion. In themselves, norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. The age-old distinctions between legality and morality, on the one hand, between "actual" and "formalistic" morality, on the other hand, also attest to the fact that socially living humans have never confused the keeping to forms with the ponderability (calculability) of the Other.

What applies to the norms of daily behaviour in the narrower or wider lifeworld, applies likewise to the more elevated, lofty or upscale cultural norms and culturally constructed meaning contexts (contexts pertaining to meaning), that is, to the great systems of art, of science, of religion, of myth etc.. Schütz's statement, – it could also have emanated from Parsons, – that these systems "as interpretive schemata, pre-exist every interpretation of meaning of alien action (i.e. the action of others)"[30], must be understood cum grano salis (= Latin = with a grain of salt), they have, at any rate, fairly little to do with the ponderability

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[30] *Aufbau*, p. 45.

(calculability) of alien action (the action of others). Because the culturally pre-given norms or meaning contexts (contexts of meaning) constitute, first of all, only a formal framework, inside of which very much is acted out (or takes place), namely, the spectrum of the social relation can unfold and develop in its entire breadth. The fact *that* the Ego commands and dominates the cultural language [[for itself(, not in general)]] in which the Other expresses itself as a social being, does not grant or offer him (the Ego) any certain and secure knowledge about *what* the Other will express. A German does not know in advance that another German will treat him in a friendly manner already because it is certain that this (German) speaks the same language as that (German); nothing else happens between Christians, scientists or artists, who think more or less within the same meaning contexts. Formulated theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory): the commonality of the meaning context (or context of meaning), inside of which a social relation takes place and is acted out, is not allowed to be confused with the ponderability (calculability) of the process of this same social relation. Moreover, this meaning context is not understood at all by everyone, and always, in the same manner. It (The said meaning context) constitutes at every moment an object of interpretation, and in the interpretations undertaken, the shifts in the spectrum of the social relation are reflected or shown. From that which occurs in this spectrum, the scientific interpretation of those interpretations must therefore start, not the other way around. The, in itself, correct talk of the intersubjective construction of cultural meaning contexts should not suggest the false impression that in this process everyone would participate as like-minded partners, and with equal rights. According to the movements in the spectrum of the social relation, everyone must reserve for himself here a right of interpretation and a right of deviation or divergence, – that is, everyone reserves the right to be imponderable and incalculable, and partakes of ponderability (calculability) on condition of imponderability (incalculability). This can take place in two opposed forms,

which are already implied in our explications above. On the one hand, the subject in daily life does not pay attention to (i.e. it completely ignores) banal or lofty norms, because the subject is overwhelmed by the task of transforming and translating them (the said banal or lofty norms) into (or applying them to) each and every respective concrete situation. On the other hand, it (i.e. the subject) holds onto and clings to these (norms) because these are frequently proved to be neutral enough to promote acts and actions which "normally" are not regarded as "normal"; thus, for instance, robbers and blackmailers presuppose that rules and norms of language will be kept to by, and on, both sides, so that "(mutual) understanding functions"[31].

   Phenomenologists of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologists would come much closer to reality if they took as the starting point of their thoughts and considerations the image or picture which frequently-attested-to Common Sense makes of socially living humans regarding "(the) world and man". Calming, reassuring and soothing anonymities and automatisms do not dominate this image/picture, but the feeling or sense predominates and preponderates that "normality" and "exception", the ponderable (calculable) and the imponderable (incalculable), grip, grasp and intertwine with one another, that one indeed must, without [[doing]] any damage or harm to oneself, be courteous and obliging, but at the same time, forearmed and prepared for the unforeseen and unexpected, and "on guard". The consequences of inattentiveness and naivety have to be attributed to every person himself. Common Sense, therefore, does not draw up, devise or plan two different pictures (images) of the social world, one for good weather conditions, and one for bad weather conditions, but one single relatively rich-in-nuances picture or image. At the centre or focal point of this picture, a likewise rich-in-nuances or ambivalent perception (view) of man

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[31] See in relation to that, Goffman's good remarks (comments and observations), "Interaction Order", p. 5. This point is of central significance and importance for the judgement of normative communication theory, and we must come back to it, see Section D, below, in this chapter.

as the object or reason/cause of/for trust, and at the same time of mistrust, of hope and at the same time of fear – as a ponderable and a "rational", but at the same time, as an imponderable (incalculable) and an "affective" being, stands or is found. And even when the bright, light and dark tones of this united image or picture seems sometimes to become separated from one another, in order to emit, produce or constitute images or pictures independent from one another, then, nevertheless, one of these pictures (images) serves merely as the background of the other: the general representation and notion of the social and of man consequently remains mixed and ambivalent, even if it is placed under a vault (canopy, dome or arch) of a howsoever-put-together-and-made religious or secularised, in any case, relieving (as to the stress/tension of existence), theodicy. It is also not to be otherwise expected, if that "fundamental anxiety", which Schütz himself rightly – but without drawing the necessary systematic conclusions from that – calls a "basic experience"[32], is in actual fact fundamental, that is, it (the said "fundamental anxiety") imbues (saturates and soaks) social behaviour in toto. Newer social-psychological approaches, which one subsumes under the rubric "dramaturgical model", showed a finer and more refined sensorium or sixth sense as regards the situation of tension (stress or intensity), which comes into being in every interaction on the basis of the fact that the Ego must reckon with and on seeing the possibility his claims to recognition of his publicly-put-forward identity being rejected, repudiated or relativised; that the Ego, therefore, must at all times be prepared and braced for an emergency or the worst[33]. The said newer social-psychological approaches move, nonetheless, in the narrower horizon of that which Schütz called the environment; but for us here the knowledge is important that also the typified and anonymised with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is

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[32] *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 228.
[33] We shall concern ourselves and deal with these approaches in the discussion of the question and problem of identity in the 3rd volume of this work.

not merely grey and neutral or indifferent, but rather a further source of the same ambivalences and split expectations of the environment. The with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can likewise be insecure, uncertain and imponderable (incalculable); now here relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of existence can function as anonymisation and typification. But every relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of life and existence is a great weight on and weighs down that which is supposed to be relieved (as regards the tension and stress of existence).

The subject trusts the great systems of culture, and daily life or norms of culture, so little, that it probably develops its own "private scientific system"[34] in order to assess and evaluate the becoming and events, and accordingly to orientate itself in its action, in short, in order to become master of imponderability (incalculability). The social-ontological opening up, illuminating and reconstruction of this system appears to be possible, because it, in all subjects, revolves around ascertainable formal variables. The difficulty lies, not so much in its (this social-ontological opening up's) formation and development, which on the basis of anthropological aptitudes or predispositions, as it were, takes place spontaneously, albeit in a reflected way (i.e. as to cognitive reflection), but in its handling and treatment, that is, in the cases of well-aimed judgements about each and every respective content-related formation of those formal variables, depending on each and every respective Other and on each and every respective concrete situation. (It is a matter here, obviously, of another form of the above-described discrepancy or complementarity between the formal mechanism of the social relation and the great variety and diversity of the content(s) with which the said formal mechanism of the social relation can be connected – or as regards one further variation of the interlocking, interconnecting or intertwining of ponderability

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[34] Ruesch-Bateson, *Communication*, p. 26.

(calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), whereby ponderability (calculability) more likely concerns the form, and imponderability (incalculability) more likely concerns the content.) As the foundation of this system, the knowledge of the Other functions as subjectivity, which does not constitute something to be merely manipulated, but an action centre, from which damage (harm and or hurt) and benefit or utility can emanate for the Ego – and indeed, in the widest sense of these terms, that is also unpleasant and pleasant, friendly and inimical etc.. The tracing back of the effects of alien activity (i.e. the activity of the Other) to the intention of the Other, now marks a decisive turn in the social relation, as this social relation is seen from the perspective of the I (ego). It (The said tracing back of ...) simultaneously marks a deepening of the understanding of the subjectivity of the Other. This subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active) but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. Since the I (ego) perceives in this wider sense that the I (ego) perceives, and the other way around, both sides ascribe to each other a higher degree of (self-)consciousness, awareness and purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency). This of course means also a higher degree of dangers and risks, but at the same time it creates the basis upon which end(goal)-rational (purposeful and expedient) attempts for the influencing of the Other can take place. Since outer (external) action is founded on perception, and since perception directly interrelates with the rating (evaluation and assessment) and the formation of motivation, thus must the I (ego) want to influence the perception of the Other, that is, put himself in (and or empathise with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation in such a way that the putting of the Other in the position and situation of the I (ego) is carried out in accordance with the

representations and notions of the I (ego). The Other endeavours for and aspires to, on his part, being in the knowledge of the same mechanism, the same aim, such that the behaviour and endeavour of one side turns into the motivating cause of or reason for the behaviour and endeavour of the other (side) (as well as the other way around), and the interaction is potentised (i.e. becomes more intense, dynamic,... multiplies and climaxes).

But the, in practice, usable system of orientation, which the subject constructs, cannot only exist in the conjectures and suppositions regarding alien intentions (i.e. the intention of (the) other(s)). Since the perception of the Other means on the part of the I (ego), a comprehensive putting of oneself in (and or empathising with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation, thus to the assessment of intentions as what is most subjective and most mobile and agile, an assessment of the more subjective[x] and the more fixed (steady or stable), comes to be added. This objectification (or objectivisation), which obviously is supposed to serve the reduction of imponderability (incalculability), begins in the subjectivity of the Other itself, to which more or less stable dispositions being manifested in identically recurring modes of acting and behaving, are ascribed. Dispositions now appear as the united invariable background or backdrop, from which individual positionings and acts spring, yet the reduction of these (individual positionings and acts) to that (backdrop (with dispositions)) remains too linear and simplistic in order to be sufficient for all situations as a model of explanation (i.e. explanatory model). Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject's (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in

which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. Depending on whether the acting and action is derived from the (supposed) discretion of the Other, or from the requirements and demands of an independent-of-it-(i.e. this (supposed) discretion) situation, the classification takes place, whereby the positioning and attitude of the I towards the Other is considerably influenced by the impression which the I (ego) itself has formed about the extent or degree of the conscious responsibility of the Other for its good or bad (evil) acts and deeds. The (supposed) intent(ion) of the acting (person, subject etc.) weighs so heavily and greatly during (the) judgement of the acting (or act(ion)), that one could almost think that inner or outer (internal or external) objective factors – that is, factors given without help or input from the subject concerned – would only be taken into account so that the effect of the intent(ion) can be isolated and assessed so much the more forcefully and or urgently. That is also not additionally surprising. Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity *as* subjectivity par excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).

One could call this schema or system the "naive analysis of action"[35], which stamps (shapes or moulds) the social perception of subjects as actors and interacting (beings, entities). The immediate (or direct) nearness (proximity) of Common Sense to the fundamental insights of every scientific analysis is also noticeable (or also stands out) here, and this nearness would continue standing

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[35] According to an expression by Heider, see *Psychology*, esp. Ch. 3, 4 and 10. Cf. the concise remarks of Tagiuri, "Introduction", esp. x-xi, xv, as well as the "theory of correspondent inferences" developed by Jones-Davis, "From Acts to Dispositions" subsequent to Heider's analyses, esp. pp. 223ff., 226ff., 237ff..

out and being noticeable, if we wanted to illuminate and investigate this same schema or system from other sides (i.e. aspects or facets), like for instance descriptions of alien (i.e. other) persons and self-descriptions of persons undertaken on the basis of the same, less numerous (i.e. small-in-number) categories of perception, and like the more general or vaguer categories for the description of persons differing from the more special (particular) or more concrete categories for the description of situations etc.[36]. Instead of this, however, we want to linger or dwell somewhat longer on the central meaning (significance and importance) of (the) intent(ion) for the evaluation or judgement of act(ion)s, since precisely and primarily therein (i.e. the intention), the consciousness of subjects manifests itself and finds expression so that they meet or encounter one another *as* subjects, i.e. as bearers of identities and abilities, which cannot be interpreted and handled or treated in the same manner as what is objective in general (things or unalterable and immutable situations). From action, on the basis of intentions, the unexpected can be expected, since intentions at least prima vista are more arbitrary than the compulsions of the objective (i.e. what is objective), and at the same time, the said intention-based action's assumption and acceptance founds and legitimises the classifications and reactions on the part of the Other, who can, as a result, be active and act also like a subject. Because only vis-à-vis a subject can the subject fully and completely be a subject. Investigation self-evidently at this level remains undiscussed, and irrespective of whether in actual fact things are thus, whether, that is, intentions are really autonomous, whether the subject has a free will and is, in the absolute sense, capable of calculation etc.. It is only of interest to which perception of the Other as subject, is the I (ego) inevitably and invariably driven by its own subjectivity. Subjects can look at and regard one another only thus – sometimes even when knowing better. There exists, though, no doubt,

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[36] Hastorf et al., "Problem of Relevance", p. 61.

that in every fairly sober judgement or interpretation of an act/ing (action), the objective boundaries and compulsions (coercion(s) and constraints) are taken into account, and this, as well, in the smaller or greater mad rush and hectic situation of everyday life. Just as indubitable is, however, the fact proven by social-psychological investigations that in actors, the strong and intense proclivity exists to accord to objective factors less weight than that which would befit them (such objective factors) inside a purely rational reconstruction of the process of acting and action. The meaning and content of an act(ion) preserve their intrinsic value irrespective of the circumstances under which these take place[37]. The friendly or inimical attitude of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the Other accordingly depends essentially on an evaluation and judgement of the act(ion) of the Other by means of the criteria "intent(ion)", "responsibility", "justification"[38]. That means that in regard to the imputation of good intentions to the Other, act(ion)s and modes of behaviour are not taken as being bad or evil, which would otherwise have to provide reason and grounds for conflict and enmity. Aggressivity increases normally, not with the extent of the damage suffered, but correspondingly with the presumed intensity of the Other's bad or evil intentions[39]. Conversely, thankfulness, gratitude or gratefulness for good deeds (and blessings) received depends on the assessment and appreciation of the intentions and of the unselfish and altruistic motivation of the do-gooder and benefactor, rather than on the material or other value of the gift (i.e. the thing given and donated)[40].

Naturally, the favourable or unfavourable evaluation or assessment of the intentions of the Other does not always translate linearly into friendly or inimical act(ion)s of the I (ego) vis-à-vis him (i.e. the Other). Because the I (ego) is at all times conscious of the difference between what is subjectively

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[37] Jones-Harris, "Attribution of Attitudes", esp. 1, p. 22.
[38] Pepitone, "Attributions of Causality", esp. pp. 259-264.
[39] Epstein-Taylor, "Instigation to Aggression", p. 288.
[40] Goranson-Berkowitz, "Reciprocity and Responsibility".

meant by the Other, and the objective effects, that is, the effects of the foreseeable (estimated or anticipated) meaning of his (i.e. the Other's) acts, and must often orientate his (the I's) own action towards this latter objective meaning of the Other's acts. The I (ego) will, consequently, normally defend himself if the Other made preparations and took measures to kill him (the I) out of love, and he (the I) can behave or conduct himself for reasons of purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) friendlily vis-à-vis someone in respect of whom, the I (ego) knows that he (i.e. that someone) places little value on (despises and disdains), and wants for the I (ego) even something bad or evil (harm). Particular consideration of intentions, and the distinction between subjectively meant and objective meaning, or between intentions and the effects of alien action (i.e. the action of others), exist, therefore, in the social perception of the subject next to one another, and are combined in various ways. Nietzsche oversimplified things when he skipped (i.e. overlooked) that consideration (of intentions) and that distinction (between subjectively meant and objective meaning), and opined that the I (ego) clearly and obviously starts from the effects of alien act(ion)s (i.e. the acts of others) on himself (i.e. the I), he (the I) takes or infers from these effects, the intentions of the Other, and from these intentions, he then judges the character of the Other[41]. The principal interrelation between subjectivity and more or less imponderable (incalculable) personal particularity inside social perception is seen, however, not only in regard to the particular interest in intentions in their distinction as to the effects of the (alien) action (i.e. action of others). It (The said principal interrelation between subjectivity and ...) is recognisable also in the interpretations of intersubjective constellations. In situations, e.g., in which

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[41] *Morgenröte*, § 102, cf. § 118 = Werke, II, pp. 1076, 1093. [[The Greek translator makes a comment here of some interest though I am not going to bother with it (it's not necessary; it's a bit "smart-arse"-like and does not affect the crux of P.K.'s point = translator's note = absolutely nothing to do with P.K. Further note: almost immediately after his comment, the Greek translator does not fully translate a phrase and FUCKS UP the meaning of P.K.'s text and line of thought/argumentation – he has done this a number of times throughout all of his translations of P.K., and such sloppiness is inexcusable, though overall the Greek Translator has done an excellent job, because overall he is an excellent, experienced, veteran translator.]]

those taking part/the participants behave similarly, behaviour is normally ascribed to the demands and requirements of the situation-position/ circumstances, rather than to individual proclivities and propensities, whereas diverging opinions and modes of behaviour by way of preference are in the habit of being put down and reduced to subjective peculiarities and particularities, rather than to objective conditions or compulsions (constraints or coercion)[42]. The weight and the imponderability of the subjectivity are only downplayed or denied when this is in the interest of a certain subject in dealing with another subject. Since the ascription or attribution of intentions or dispositions is, not least of all, a means of orientation and a possible instrument of control, the I (ego) directs, as expected, its attention to the Other, which can vary, and at the same time is influenced, and conversely, the I (ego) moves into the foreground (i.e. comes to the fore), itself, what more or less is supposed to appear unalterable and immutable. The I (ego) tends, therefore, in relation to that, to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant for the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances[43]. All this can proceed in good faith, or via unconscious rationalisations, or else reflectively (i.e. with reflection) and calculatedly. Something else is, nevertheless, decisive. The downplaying of the weight and significance, and the role, of subjectivity, remains the work of subjectivity, and is one of subjectivity's possible social strategies. From strategy there will, of course, be no social-ontological fact. Because from the perspective of the Other, the matter appears to be different, and the constant mutual (reciprocal) replacement of the I-role (role of the I (ego)) by the Other-role (role of the Other), the constant interchange or exchange of the view of things and of the strategies in the subjects remaining

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[42] Kelley, "Attribution"; cf. Jones-Harris, "Attribution", p. 23.
[43] Kelley, "Attribution".

the same, lets the predominance of the subjective factor in social perception stand out and become evident all to more clearly.

ENDNOTES –

<mark>**NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.. DON'T FORGET, THE TRANSLATOR WAS BORN MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND YEARS AGO AND HAS GONE INSANE. DON'T WASTE YOUR TIME READING HIM AND HIS STUPID NOTES (THOUGHTS, COGITATIONS, RUMINATIONS).**</mark>

i I.e. social ontology only takes into consideration the inner mechanism of the social relation's formal (not content-related, psychological) course.

ii If one does not have some sort of idea what e.g. a "friend's" or "foe's" or "indifferent person's" position is in regard to one's own positioning, then one has not an – obviously to many different and varying degrees – a friend or foe or someone indifferent before him, as the case may be (on a case-by-case basis, of course).

iii Don't forget, this is from the point of view of the subjectivity. In actual fact, the social (and the spectrum of the social relation) pre-exist the subjectivity, for there can be no human subjectivities without society and its (previous to this subjectivity) subjectivities.

iv "The Azande (plural of "Zande" in the Zande language) are an ethnic group of North Central Africa. They live primarily in the northeastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in south-central and southwestern part of South Sudan, and in southeastern Central African Republic." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zande_people)

v "Jabo ... is the self-designation of an ethnic group located in the South-Eastern part of the Republic of Liberia in West Africa. They have also sometimes referred to themselves as Gweabo ... or Nimiah tribe." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jabo_people)

vi The German text does not have a "nicht" = "not". Given the context, one could agree with the Greek translator Λευτέρης Ἀναγνώστου (who includes a «δὲν» = "not") that the text was supposed to include a "not". Alternatively, the clause/phrase could read: "it (the said knowledge) can (potentially, but no definitely) constitute in itself a reason for interaction". On the other hand, the clause/phrase also makes sense as it is, because we are talking about constituting a ***reason*** for (inter)action and ***not*** constituting actual (inter)action.

vii **AAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!**

viii Obviously, we all know by now which particular group of humans in particular benefitted from this state of affairs in a particular country which dominated much of the world scene for much of the 20th century (and beyond, though...).

ix **AAAAAAAAAAAAA-HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA!!** *Καὶ ὁ νοῶν, νοείτω*!

x The Greek translator states "more objective", which in German would mean „Objektiverem" rather than „Subjektiverem" as provided by the German text. Given the overall context, there is probably more than a possibility that the Greek translator is right and the German text as is, is presented in error as regards the word in question, though on the other hand "more subjective" is actually more objective than "most subjective", and it could very well be that the German text is correct as it is.